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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - GOVERNMENTAL APPEAL OF CRIMINAL
SENTENCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE.
United States v. DiFrancesco (U.S. 1980)
In 1977 and 1978, Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted in separate
trials in the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York 1 on federal racketeering charges based on his participation
in an "arson-for-hire" scheme and the 1970 "Columbus Day bombings." 2
Prior to the first trial, the government notified the trial court that due
to his history of dangerous crimes,3 DiFrancesco was a special offender
within the meaning of the Dangerous Special Offender Act (Act),4 and
1. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101
S. Ct. 426, 429 (1980).
2. 101 S. Ct. at 430. At the first trial, DiFrancesco was convicted of
racketeering and conspiracy in connection with an "arson-for-hire" operation
conducted in Rochester, New York, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) & (d)
(1976). Id. The evidence showed that this arson ring conspired with property
owners to defraud insurance companies of approximately $48,000. id. The
maximum punishment for a violation of § 1962 is a fine of not more than
$25,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, plus specified
forfeitures. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). At the second trial, DiFrancesco was
convicted of damaging federal property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976),
of unlawfully storing explosive materials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(j)
(1976) and of conspiring to commit those offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
571 (1976). 101 S. Ct. at 429. Section 1361 provides that the maximum
penalty for the destruction of federal property, if the damage exceeds $100, is a
fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). The maximum punishment for a violation of
§ 8420) is a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than
1 year, or both. 18 U.S.C. §844(b) (1976). Section 371 specifies that the
maximum punishment for its violation, when the conspiracy is in regard to an
offense which is not a misdemeanor, is a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §*371 (1976).
3. See note 8 infra.
4. 101 S. Ct. at 430. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976) (originally enacted as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922).
Section 3575 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever an attorney charged with the prosecution of a de-
fendant in a court of the United States . . . has reason to. believe
that the defendant is a dangerous special offender such attorney, ...
may sign and file with the court, . . . a notice (I) specifying that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender who upon conviction for
such felony is subject to the imposition of a sentence under subsection
(b) of this section . ...
(b) U pon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or find-
ing of guilty of the defendant of such felony, a hearing shall be held,
(1021)
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sought an increased sentence as provided therein.5 After DiFrancesco's
conviction, the district court held a sentencing hearing,7 determined
that the defendant was a special offender,s and sentenced DiFrancesco
to a ten-year term of imprisonment to be served concurrently with
the sentence of nine years imprisonment imposed after DiFrancesco's
other conviction. 9
before sentence is imposed, by the court sitting without a jury ....
If it appears by a preponderance of the information, including infor-
mation submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing
hearing and so much of the presentence report as the court relies
upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special offender, the court
shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term
not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to
the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such a felony.
Otherwise it shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the law
prescribing penalties for such felony . . ..
(e) A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this sectionif -
(3) such felony was, or the defendant committed such felony
in furtherance of, a conspiracy with three or more other persons to en-
gage in a pattern of conduct criminal under applicable laws of any
jurisdiction, and the defendant did, or agreed that he would, initiate,
organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, or supervise all or part of such
conspiracy or conduct, or give or receive a bribe or use force as all or
part of such conduct ....
(0 A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a
period of confinement longer than that provided for such felony is
required for the protection of the public from further criminal con-
duct by the defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
5. 101 S. Ct. at 430. Section 3575(b) allows the court to sentence a special
offender to a prison term not to exceed 25 years and not disproportionate in
severity to the maximum penalty allowable for the committed felony. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(b) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
6. 101 S. Ct. at 423. DiFrancesco was first sentenced to eight years for the
damage to federal property charge and five years on the conspiracy charge, both
sentences to be served concurrently, and one year on the unlawful storage
charge, to be served consecutively. Id. See note 2 supra.
7. 101 S. Ct. at 430. A sentencing hearing to determine whether the de-
fendant is a special offender is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976). For the
text of that section, see note 4 supra.
8. 101 S. Ct. at 430. The district court found that DiFrancesco's criminal
record revealed a pattern of habitual criminal conduct and therefore that he
must be sentenced to as long a term as possible in order to protect the public
from further violent and dangerous criminal conduct. Id. The court noted
that DiFrancesco had a criminal record which included other convictions for
bombings, loan sharking and murder which revealed "virtually continuous
criminal conduct over the past eight years ...... Id.
9. Id. at 429. DiFrancesco had received a total of nine years imprisonment
for his convictions at the second trial. Id. See note 6 supra. With the im-
position of the 10-year sentence for the conviction at the first trial, to be served
concurrently with the nine-year former sentence, DiFrancesco was to serve a
total of 10 years imprisonment. 101 S. Ct. at 429.
2
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The United States, claiming that the sentence imposed was so
lenient that it constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion,10
appealed pursuant to the appeal provision of the special offender statute
(section 3576).11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit dismissed the government's appeal 12 on the ground that to
allow the government to appeal a sentence would place the defendant
"in jeopardy of life or limb" a second time in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment.'2 On writ of certiorari,
14
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute
authorizing the government's appeal from the imposition of a special
offender sentence does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
fifth amendment, and hence is constitutional. United States v. DiFran-
cesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980).
Historically, the government did not have the power to appeal in
criminal cases. 15 In the early decision of United States v. Sanges,' 6 the
Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1891 17 was not sufficiently
explicit to overcome the common law rule that the government could not
10. 101 S. Ct. at 431. The United States claimed that the district court,
having found the defendant to be a dangerous special offender, abused its dis-
cretion in imposing a sentence which amounted to only one year additional
imprisonment. Id.
11. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). Section 3576 reads in pertinent part:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a
sentence after proceedings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review
of the sentence on the record of the sentenciig court may be taken by
the defendant or the United States to a court of appeals . . . . The
taking of a review of the sentence by the United States shall be deemed
the taking of a review of the sentence and an appeal of the conviction
by the defendant. Review of the sentence shall include review of
whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were
clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused.
The court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering
the record, including the entire presentence report, information sub-
mitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing, and
the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the sentence,
impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing
court could have originally imposed, or remand for further sentencing
proceedings and imposition of sentence, except that a sentence may be
made more severe only on review of the sentence taken by the United
States . . . . Any review of the sentence taken by the United States
may be dismissed on a showing of abuse of the right of the United
States to take such review.
Id. Section 3576 has a twin in 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) (1976) (originally enacted as
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 409(h), 84 Stat. 1266).
12. 604 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980).
13. 604 F.2d at 783, 787. The court of appeals also affirmed the judgments
of conviction. Id. at 787.
14. 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
15. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1891).
16. 144 U.S. 310 (1891).
17. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, 828 (1891).
10231980-81]
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appeal in a criminal case.' 8 The Court concluded that without express
statutory authority, the government could not maintain the appeal.19
Congress responded with its first Criminal Appeals Act 2 0 which granted
the government authority to appeal in criminal cases, but only in limited
circumstances. 21 After several amendments designed to clear up what
the Supreme Court considered the "vagaries of the Act," 2 in 1970,
Congress repealed the Act and substituted a new Criminal Appeals
Act 23 designed to extend the Government's appeal rights to the con-
stitutional limits. 24 In United States v. Wilson 25 the Court had the
opportunity to review the new Act, and declared that with its provi-
sions, "Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Govern-
ment appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would
permit." 26
The fifth amendment guarantees that no person shall "be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 27 In
Green v. United States,28 the Supreme Court elaborated on the interests
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court stated that the
guiding principle of the clause is that the State, with all the resources
it can bring to bear, should not be given several opportunities to con-
18. 144 U.S. at 322-23.
19. Id. at 318. The Sanges Court stated that "under the common law
. and in the absence of any statute expressly giving the right to the State,
a writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in
favor of the defendant ....... Id.
20. Act of March 2, 1903, Pub. L. No. 59-223, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907). The
Act authorized government appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or
arresting judgment where the ruling was based on "the invalidity, or con-
struction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded," and from a
decision sustaining a special plea in bar when the defendant had not yet been
placed in jeopardy. Id. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-37
(1975).
21. Act of March 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-223, 34 Stat. 1246. For a dis-
cussion of the circumstances in which the government could take an appeal
under this statute, see note 20 supra.
22. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). The Court found
the statute "unruly," as its terms were construed in the light of common law
meanings, and the rules authorizing appeals became "highly technical." Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). Section 3731 was originally enacted as Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat.
1890. For the pertinent text of the Act, see note 24 infra.
24. S. RP,. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). The Act itself allows
an appeal by the government "from a decision, judgment, or order of a district
court dismissing an indictment or information . . . except that no appeal
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits further prosecution." 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
25. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
26. Id. at 337.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment has been held to apply
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
28. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
1024
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vict a defendant for an alleged crime, thus "subjecting him to embar-
rassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continu-
ing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty." 29 In North Caro-
lina v. Pearce,30 the Court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause
contemplates three protections: first, against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; second, against a second prosecution
for the same offense after a conviction; and last, against multiple
punishments for the same offense.3 1
The Supreme Court has often stated that in no other area does
the principle of double jeopardy more fully apply than in absolutely
barring reprosecution after acquittal. 32 In Arizona v. Washington,83
the Court explained this principle in stating that "[t]he public interest
in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted de-
fendant may not be retried even though 'the acquittal was based upon
an egregiously erroneous foundation.' "34 In contrast to a verdict of
innocence, the Court has repeatedly declared that reprosecution is not
barred by double jeopardy after a court-declared mistrial,3 5 unless a
mistrial is declared for other than legitimate reasons such that justice
requires barring the prosecution from retrying the accused.86
29. Id. at 187-88. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Green, see
notes 42-43 and accompanying text infra.
30. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
31. Id. at 717. For facts and holding of Pearce, see notes 46-49 and ac-
companying text infra.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141,
143 (1962) (per curiam).
33. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
34. Id. at 503, quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)
(per curiam). The Court further concluded that "[i]f the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair." 434 U.S. at 503.
35. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). In
Perez, the Court announced that a second trial is not barred by double jeopardy
protection where, "taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a
manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated." Id. at 579. See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
463-64 (1973); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894); Simmons
v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891).
36. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (trial judge unnecessarily
declared mistrial when a continuance would have been effective); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (prosecutor requested a mistrial because a
key witness was unavailable). The Supreme Court has declared that this ex-
ception is based on the policy of protecting a defendant against "governmental
actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants
to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions." United States
v. Dimitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
One commentator has stressed that the "manifest necessity" standard ap-
plied in mistrial cases must be construed liberally in favor of the government
as it is in "society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity
to convict those who have violated its laws .... .. " Stern, Government Ap.
10251980-81]
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More complicated double jeopardy issues are raised when the state
attempts to reprosecute after the accused has gained reversal of his
conviction on appeal. 7 In United States v. Ball,38 the Supreme Court
first announced that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar retrial
after reversal of a conviction.39 In a subsequent case, the Court, ex-
panding on Ball, declared that a successful appeal by a defendant
resulting in the reversal of his conviction, constituted a "waiver" of
the double jeopardy protection against reprosecution for not only the
same offense, but also for any greater offense originally charged.4 0
In Green v. United States,41 the Court limited the waiver theory in
holding that it is unreasonable to view a defendant's successful appeal
of a conviction of a lesser included offense as a waiver of his constitu-
tional double jeopardy protection as to the greater offense of which he
peals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and Unreasonable
Sentences, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 57 (1980), quoting Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. at 509.
37. For a discussion of post-reversal retrials and a criticism of the Court's
lack of consistency in this area, see Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial
Appeals of Sentences, 83 VA. L. REV. 325, 329-32 (1977).
38. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
39. Id. at 672. Justice Gray, writing for the Court, stated that "a de-
fendant, who procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set
aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indict-
ment, for the same offence of which he had been convicted." Id.
40. The waiver theory was first introduced in Trono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521, 533 (1905). The Trono Court explained the basis of the waiver theory
as follows:
As the judgment [of conviction] stands before [the defendant] appeals,
it is a complete bar to any further prosecution for the offense set forth
in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No person can
wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to
appeal from it and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if success-
ful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the greater
offense contained in the judgment which he has himself procured to
be reversed.
Id. See also Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919); Ocampo v. United
States, 234 U.S. 91, 102 (1914); Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S. 372, 374
(1907).
The waiver theory was subsequently further defined by the Court in United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). In Tateo, Justice Harlan explained that
the waiver theory was in fact based on a "balancing interests" analysis, in that:
[clorresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the
societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has ob-
tained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to
pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because
of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings
leading to conviction.
Id. at 466. The Tateo Court concluded that this societal interest outweighed
the defendant's interests, and thus reaffirmed its previous position, iterated in
Ball, allowing reprosecution for the same offense subsequent to reversal. 377
U.S. at 468.
41. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
1026 [VOL. 26: p. 1021
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss5/3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
was acquitted. 42 Consequently, a conviction of a lesser included offense
acts as an "implied acquittal" of the greater offense for double jeopardy
purposes.
43
Though reprosecutions may raise serious double jeopardy problems,
it is the protection against multiple punishment 44 which is most im-
plicated in governmental appeals of sentences. 45 In North Carolina v.
Pearce,46 the Court considered a double jeopardy challenge to an
increased sentence imposed upon conviction after a court-ordered re-
trial.47 The Pearce Court stated that, since Ball, it has been well
settled that the government has the power to retry a defendant who
has succeeded in having his conviction set aside and that a corollary
to that power "is the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to
impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not
it is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction." 48 In
42. Id. at 191-92. In Green, the defendant was indicted for arson and first
degree murder. Id. at 185. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the arson
charge and on the lesser charge of second degree murder. Id. at 186. On
appeal, the defendant's conviction for second degree murder was reversed on
the ground that it was not supported by the evidence. Id. On remand, the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder, leading to his second appeal
based on double jeopardy. Id.
43. Id. at 190-92. The Court reasoned that since the jury could have con-
victed the defendant for first degree murder and no extraordinary circumstances
were shown to have prevented it from doing so, the defendant was impliedly
acquitted for first degree murder. Id. at 190-91.
However, the Court did not completely disregard Ball, as it reaffirmed its
position "that a defendant can be tried a second time for an offense when his
prior conviction for that same offense had been set aside on appeal." Id. at
189, citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
The "implied acquittal" principle was the basis of one convincing argu-
ment against government appeals of sentences where, by analogy, an imposition
of a sentence below the available maximum was argued to amount to an
implied acquittal of the longer sentence. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606,
634-35 (1965). See also Freeman & Earley, United States v. DiFrancesco:
Government Appeal of Sentences, 18 AM. CuM. L. REV. 91, 113-15 (1980).
But see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720. For a discussion of Pearce,
see notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
45. See Freeman & Earley, supra note 43, at 103-04.
46. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
47. Id. at 713. Pearce involved a defendant who, several years after his
initial conviction and sentence, had his conviction reversed and was subjected
to a second trial. Id. Upon conviction at this second trial, the defendant was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which, when added to the amount of
time already served, amounted to a longer sentence than that of the original
conviction. Id.
48. Id. at 720, citing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). The
Court stated that since Green dealt with retrial following acquittal, it was in-
applicable and could not be used to argue that the defendant's initial sentence
constituted an "implied acquittal" of any greater sentence. 395 U.S. at 720
n.16. For a discussion of Green, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Pearce holding in the context of jury
sentencing in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Both the Pearce
10271980-81]
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reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was inapplicable where "the original conviction has, at the
defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." 49
A different double jeopardy problem arises with respect to a trial
court's power to alter an existing sentence once imposed. In United
States v. Benz,50 the Supreme Court held that a trial judge may recall
a defendant and reduce his sentence even though the defendant had
begun serving his prison term.51 However, the Benz Court, relying on
its earlier decision in Ex Parte Lange,52 stated that although the sen-
tence may be reduced, the punishment may not be augmented for "to
increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment
for the same offense in violation of the ... Constitution .... ." 53 Benz
and Chaffin opinions focused on the need for discretion in fashioning an ap-
propriate sentence upon retrial, and the sentiment that sentencing is an integral
part of the trial process. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 25; North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24. See Note, supra note 37, at 337-42.
49. 395 U.S. at 721. Although the Court held that the imposition of the
larger sentence is not unconstitutional, it did state that any time already served
must be subtracted from the second sentence. Id. at 718-19.
The Pearce Court did, however, warn that prosecutorial vindictiveness is
to have no impact in the decision to increase the defendant's sentence following
reconviction, as this would tend to "chill" appeals by convicted defendants.
Id. at 723-25. To insure that vindictiveness is not a motivating factor in any
increased sentence, the Court directed that the factual basis for the increase in
sentence be set forth in the record, so that the "constitutional legitimacy" of
the sentence may be reviewed on appeal. Id. at 726. For a thorough discussion
of the due process considerations involved when harsher penalties follow re-
convictions, see Gilbreath, The Constitutionality of Harsher Sentences on Re-
trial in Virginia, 62 VA. L. REv. 1337 (1976). See also Note, Criminal Pro-
cedure - Due Process Is Not Violated When Prosecutor Carries Out Threat
To Bring Increased Charges After Defendant Refuses to Plead Guilty During
Plea Bargaining Session, 24 ViLL. L REv. 142 (1978).
50. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
51. Id. at 306-07, 311. The Court stated that "[t]he general rule is that
judgments, decrees and orders are within the control of the court during the
term at which they were made." Id. at 306-07, citing Goddard v. Ordway, 101
U.S. 745, 752 (1879).
52. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). In Lange, the trial court sentenced the
convicted defendant to both a fine and imprisonment while the sentencing
statute authorized only a fine or a term of imprisonment. Id; at 164. After
having paid the fine and begun his prison term, the defendant filed a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming multiple punishment. Id. The Supreme Court granted
the writ on the ground that once the defendant had paid the imposed fine, the
power of the Court to punish him further was &one. Id. at 176. In discussing
.double jeopardy protection, Justice Miller, writing for the Court. exclaimed,
"Ifor of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial
if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?"
Id. at 173.
53. 282 U.S. at 307. See also Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 160
(1900) (defendant's sentence after reversal and remand was constitutional even
though more than original sentence already begun to be served, as it was .,not
a case in which the Court undertook to impose in invitum a second or addi-
tional sentence for the same offense, or to substitute one sentence for another");
Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921
(1972); United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
1028
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was subsequently qualified in Bozza v. United States, 4 where the
Court upheld as constitutional an increase in a sentence by a trial
judge who had initially sentenced the defendant only to a term of
imprisonment, although the sentencing statute required both a fine
and imprisonment. 55 The Bozza Court, in rejecting the defendant's-
double jeopardy claim, explained that the increased punishment was
not multiple punishment, as the initial sentence was invalid and, there,
fore, void. 56 Consistent with this principle is the long held practice
in lower federal courts to permit a trial court to increase a sentence
before the defendant had begun to serve his initial term of imprison-
ment.5 7
Similar to the problem of an alteration to an existing sentence is
the double jeopardy claim presented in Swisher v. Brady.S In Swisher,
the Court upheld as constitutional the Maryland procedure for ju-
venile proceedings which provided for a master to hear evidence, make
findings of fact and recommend disposition of the juvenile, and then
for a trial court to review the master's record, make a de novo deter-
mination of the facts relating to guilt or innocence and impose a final
sentence.59 The Court emphasized that the master's findings were ex-
pressly made tentative by the statutory procedure, and that the trial
court's review was limited to the record below unless otherwise con-
sented to by the minor, thus, the prosecution was not given a "second
crack" at the accused.60
Although not previously addressed by the Supreme Court,61 the
issue of government appeals of sentences has been litigated in several
U.S. 902 (1954) (resentence after clerical error found was unconstitutional as it
increased an otherwise valid sentence). For a discussion of Walsh, see notes
63-65 and accompanying text inIra.
54. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
55. Id. at 165-67. The trial court, upon realizing its mistake, recalled the
defendant and sentenced the defendant to both a fine and imprisonment. Id.
at 165-66.
56. Id. at 167. The Court stated that a trial judge may, consistent with
the Constitution, subsequently increase a defendant's sentence to meet with a
statutory minimum. Id. at 166-67. See also United States v. Denison, 603 F.2d
1143, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) ("petitions to correct illegal sentences
by mandamus have routinely been granted . . . . Federal courts have uni-
formly held that resentencing to correct an illegal sentence does not implicate
double jeopardy rights") (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216, 221 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971) (defendant on bail prior to serving sentence);
Williams v. United States, 422 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant still in trial
court's custody); Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891, 894 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965) (defendant had only been told to report to Marshal;
sentence not yet begun); United States v. Byers, 290 F.2d 515, 516 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 905 (1961) (execution of sentence suspended pending
hearing of defendant's motion for new trial).
58. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
59. Id. at 210-15 & n.9.
60. Id. at 216.
61. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
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courts of appeals.02 Most notably, the First Circuit, in Walsh v.
Picard63 held constitutional the Massachusetts procedure, which con-
ditioned a defendant's appeal of his sentence on the state's right to
cross appeal on that matter.6 4 The Walsh court noted, however, that
if the state were allowed to appeal on its own initiative, such appeal
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.6 5
Against this background, DiFrancesco for the first time presented
the Supreme Court with the question of whether government appeals
of criminal sentences are violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.6
DiFrancesco was the first case in which the government appealed under
the provisions of the Special Offender statute. 67 The Court began its
analysis by noting that a primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause was to preserve the finality of judgments.6 8 Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, reviewed the historical development of the
Double Jeopardy Clause and concluded that double jeopardy considera-
tions arise only when the government attempts to reprosecute after a
final judgment.69 Justice Blackmun stated that only in cases when the
trial has ended in acquittal does double jeopardy protection absolutely
bar a subsequent reprosecution.7 0 Thus, the Court concluded that the
62. See, e.g., Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1211 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 921 (1972); United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954) (trial court's increase in sentence upon prose-
cutor's request after learning of clerical error in original was unconstitutional
as it increased an otherwise valid sentence). For a discussion of Walsh, see
notes 63-65 and accompanying text infra.
Several courts of appeals have stated that a sentence may not constitution-
ally be increased after the punishment has already been partly suffered. See,
e.g., Oxman v. United States, 148 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945); Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 1942);
Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
63. 446 F.2d 1209 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
64. 446 F.2d at 1212. In Walsh, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to a term of imprisonment which he felt was excessive. Id. at 1210. On ap-
peal to the Appellate Division of the Massachusetts Superior Court, the State
cross appealed for a larger sentence pursuant to MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278,
§§ 28A-28D (1943). 446 F.2d at 1212. The appellate court increased the de-
fendant's sentence, which was the basis for the defendant's habeas corpus double
jeopardy claim. Id.
65. 446 F.2d at 1211, citing United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
66. United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980). justice Blackmun
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell and Rehnquist.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 431 n.9, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
68. 101 S. Ct. at 432, citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978);
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
69. 101 S. Ct. at 432. The Court explained that the underlying idea of
the clause is that once a judgment has been procured, the "state with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to con-
vict an individual for an alleged offense .... Id., quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
70. 101 S. Ct. at 433. Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[t]he law 'at-
taches particular significance to an acquittal.' " Id., quoting United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
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-double jeopardy issue focused not on whether the government could
:.appeal, but rather on "whether a criminal sentence, once pronounced,
is to be accorded constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to
,that which attaches to a jury's verdict of acquittal." 71
The issue thus framed, the Court reasoned that double jeopardy
protection extended to criminal sentencing only if the imposition of a
,sentence constitutes an "implied acquittal" of any greater sentence.72
The Court concluded that neither the common law history of criminal
* sentencing, the case law development, nor the principles of double
_jeopardy protection could support the existence of an implied acquittal
-of a greater sentence.
13
Initially, Justice Blackmun noted the common law tradition of
allowing a trial court to recall a defendant within the same term and
increase the sentence if the defendant had not yet begun to serve his
.sentence. 74 Thus, the Court concluded that at common law, sentences
never approached that degree of finality which would preclude Con-
. gress from authorizing appeals by the prosecutor.75
Next, the Court examined its own prior decisions and concluded
that sentencing has never had the "constitutional finality" that was
present in an acquittal7O Specifically, the DiFrancesco Court relied
..on the Bozza v. United States 77 and North Carolina v. Pearce 78 de-
cisions to support the imposition of a sentence longer than the initial
:sentence.79 The Court reasoned that if sentences were to be afforded
the constitutional finality of acquittals, then the original sentence in
-Pearce would have served as the upper limit on the one imposed upon
retrial.8 0 The Court concluded that, although this case involved an
71. 101 S. Ct. at 435. justice Blackmun stated that the Double Jeopardy
-Clause did not completely bar government appeals. Id., citing United States
-v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 85 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 337.
72. 101 S. Ct. at 435.
73. Id. at 436. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning in reaching this
conclusion, see notes 74-93 and accompanying text infra.
74. 101 S. Ct. at 435. The Court noted that common law principles were
important in that the Double Jeopardy Clause was drafted with the common
.law protections in mind. Id. For a brief discussion of the tradition of allow-
ing trial courts to increase sentences prior to commencement of service, see
-note 57 and accompanying text supra.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 436.
76. Id.
77. 330 U.S. 160 (1947). For a discussion of Bozza, see notes 54-56 and
:accompanying text supra.
78. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). For a discussion of Pearce, see notes 46-49 and
-accompanying text supra.
79. 101 S. Ct. at 436-37. The Court, in discussing Bozza, stated that
sentences are not final once imposed in all cases, because "[t]he Constitution
-does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by
the judge means immunity for the prisoner.". Id. at 436, quoting Bozza v.
United States, 330 U.S. at 166-67.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 436. Justice Blackmun pointed out that if an original
:sentence, less than the maximum, may be increased subsequent to retrial, then
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appeal, while Pearce involved a greater sentence imposed subsequent to
retrial, such a difference was no more than a "conceptual nicety." 81
Finally, Justice Blackmun declared that the rationale for barring
reprosecution after acquittal did not extend to sentencing.82 After
stating that the defendant's primary concern was with the determination
of guilt or innocence,83 the Court concluded that a defendant has no
legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal process
is concluded because he is charged with knowledge of the statute.84
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not give a defendant the right to "know at any specific moment
in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be." 85
The DiFrancesco Court, after concluding that double jeopardy
protection did not bar review of a sentence, determined that the in-
crease in sentence does not constitute multiple punishment.&6 Justice
Blackmun distinguished the Benz case as involving only the trial court's
ability to later reduce a sentence,8 7 and to the extent that the dictum
in Benz supported a different conclusion, limited the dictum to the
specific context of Ex Parte Lange.88 The Court further noted that
although a defendant may perceive the length of his sentence as final
once he begins serving it, there is no legitimate expectation of finality
it cannot be said that there is an "implied acquittal" of a larger sentence when
the original term is imposed. Id. at 436 n.14, citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). For a discussion of Pearce, see notes 46-49 and accom-
panying text supra.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 436-37, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 722.
For a critical discussion of the Court's treatment of Pearce, see notes 121-29
and accompanying text infra.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 437. Justice Blackmun stated that the expense, ordeal,
anxiety and possibility that, although innocent, the defendant will be found
guilty that exists in retrials is not present in a limited appeal where the de-
endant's guilt or innocence is no longer at issue. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court emphasized that, unlike the situation in a retrial, at
sentencing the defendant is not in an adversarial position for the sentence is
purely a judicial determination. Id.
85. Id. The Court analogized the possibility of an increased sentence on
appeal to revocation of parole or probation and subsequent imprisonment
where there is no implication of double jeopardy protections. Id., citing
Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000
(1964). Recognizing that a revocation of parole does not involve an increase
of a final sentence, the Court stated that this distinction "is different in no
critical respect" from the case at bar. 101 S. Ct. at 437.
86. 101 S. Ct. at 438. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in reaching
this conclusion, see notes 87-89 and accompanying text infra.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 438 (emphasis by the Court). Benz was relied upon
heavily by the Second Circuit in its determination that an increase in a valid
sentence is prohibited as amounting to multiple punishment. United States v.
DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d at 784-85. For a discussion of Benz, see notes 50-53 and
accompanying text supra.
88. 101 S. Ct. at 438. The Court thus found that there was no precedent
supporting the court of appeals' finding that the increase in sentence here
amounted to multiple punishment. Id.
1032 [VOL. 26: p. 1021
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss5/3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
-when Congress has expressly authorized government appeal of sen-
itences.89
The Court continued its analysis by asserting that Swisher v.
Brady 9 provides precedent for its conclusion that the special offender
Appeals provision did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.91 Like
the Maryland juvenile justice procedure found constitutional in
.Swisher,92 the appeal procedure contemplates a single continuing process
rather than a distinct second jeopardy.93
Justice Blackmun "not[ed] in passing" that section 3576 was a
"considered legislative attempt to attack a specific problem in our crim-
inal justice system," 94 namely, the tendency of some trial judges "to
mete out light sentences in cases involving organized crime [mem-
bers]." 95 Recognizing the heretofore broad sentencing power of trial
judges, the Court concluded that "[alppellate review creates a check
upon this unlimited power, and should lead to a greater degree of con-
:sistency in sentencing." 96 Thus, the Court reversed the court of appeals
finding that the appeal violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and re-
:manded the case for rehearing.97
89. Id., citing S. REP No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1969); Dunsky
The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19, 32 (1978).
90. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). For a discussion of Swisher, see notes 58-60 and
-accompanying text supra.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 435.
92. For a discussion of Swisher, see notes 58-60 and accompanying text
supra.
93. 101 S. Ct. at 439. justice Blackmun declared that, like the Maryland
juvenile procedure, section 3576 "does not subject the defendant to a second
-trial." d. Furthermore, the Court stated that the appeals provision under
.review here was more limited than that in Swisher, for under the Maryland
,system the trial court could make a de novo determination of the facts relating
-to guilt or innocence, while under section 3576, the Court of Appeals could
increase a sentence only when it finds that the district court had abused its
.discretion or employed unlawful procedures. For a discussion of Swisher, seej
notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra. For the text of section 3576, see
note 11 supra. Thus, the Court concluded that since the procedure in Swisher
-was held not to violate the Double jeopardy Clause, neither did the limited
-review under the special offender statute. 101 S. Ct. at 439.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 440.
95. Id., quoting THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, REPORT BY
-THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
'JUSTICE 203 (1967).
96. 101 S. Ct. at 440, citing M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITH-
,,OUT ORDER (1973); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN, & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
.AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977). The Court concluded that in at-
,tempting to deal with this recognized evil, "[t]he statute is limited in scope
and is narrowly focused on the problem so identified. It is not an example of
"Government oppression' against which the Double Jeopardy Clause stands
.guard." 101 S. Ct. at 440, citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978).Rather, the Court stated that the statute was intended to promote the govern.
-1ment interest in consistency in sentencing. 101 S. Ct. at 440.
97. 101 S. Ct. at 440.
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In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan took issue with the majority's
conclusion that an increase in sentence is not multiple punishment.98
The dissent initially observed that although Benz was not controlling,9
the Benz dictum and similar pronouncements by the Court "offer im-
pressive evidence of the strength and prevalence of the view that the
double jeopardy clause bars an increase in the sentence imposed by the
district court." 100 Moreover, Justice Brennan stated that a sentence
was analytically similar to an acquittal and should be afforded the
same degree of double jeopardy protection.101 The dissent, distinguish-
ing Pearce to encompass only increases in sentences upon retrial,10 2
agreed with the contention that a sentence of less than the maximum
is an "implied acquittal" of any larger sentence. 03 In response to the
majority's conclusion that the defendant's interest in an acquittal is
much greater than in his sentence, Justice Brennan argued that, in
reality, "most defendants are more concerned with how much time they
spend in prison than whether their record shows a conviction." 104
98. Id. at 441-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was
joined by Justices White, Marshall and Stevens. Id. Justice Stevens also filed
a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 445-46 (Stevens J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 441 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing United States v. Benz, 282
U.S. 304 (1931). For a discussion of Benz, see notes 50-53 and accompanying
text supra.
100. 101 S. Ct. at 441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting United States
v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d at 785. Specifically, Justice Brennan stated that "this
Court has consistently assumed that an increase in the severity of a sentence
subsequent to its imposition . . . constitutes multiple punishment in violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 101 S. Ct. at 441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. 101 S. Ct. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan main-
tained that just as a verdict of acquittal represents the fact finder's conclusion
that the evidence did not support a guilty verdict, so too, a sentence involves
a factual determination that the evidence does not support a larger sentence.
Id.
102. Id. at 444-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that
it is the retrial itself which allows the trial court to impose a new sentence
which is longer than the initial sentence. Id. The dissent saw the Pearce
rationale as resting primarily on the premise that "the original conviction has,
at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean."
Id. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
at 721. Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that the Court in Pearce observed
that "there is a difference between 'increases in existing sentences' and 'the
imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new trials.'" 101 S. Ct. at
44U (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 722.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan empha-
sized that the sentencing procedure involves the same type of examination and
evaluation of evidence found in the determination of guilt or innocence. Id.
Thus, the dissent reasoned that an "implied acquittal" exists in a sentence of
less than the statutory maximum, for "[i]n both acquittals and sentences, the
trier of fact makes a factual adjudication that removes from defendant's burden
of risk the charges of which he was acquitted and the potential sentence which
he did not receive." Id.
104. Id. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed to the
fact that most criminal defendants are willing to plea bargain in order to receive
more lenient sentences. Id. Justice Brennan observed that "[t]o the convicted
defendant, the sentencing phase is certainly as critical as the guilt-innocence
1034 [VOL. 26: p. 1021
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Labelling the Court's "expectation of finality" analysis as "circular,"
the dissent concluded that if that argument was extended to its logical
conclusion, Congress could constitutionally authorize government ap-
peal from verdicts of acquittal.105
Finally, Justice Brennan stated that the Court's reliance on Swisher
was misplaced, for the Maryland procedure expressly provided transmis-
sion of the master's findings to the trial judge for review, as the master
had no authority to make determinations of law or fact. 106 In contrast,
the dissent pointed out, the district court had the authority to adjudge
guilt or innocence and to impose a final sentence.1 07
DiFrancesco stands for the proposition that a defendant may, after
receiving an initial sentence upon conviction and subsequent to com-
mencing his term of imprisonment, have his sentence increased at the
behest of the government on appeal.OS Furthermore, unlike the situa-
tion where a defendant appeals his conviction, 0 9 a defendant may now
have his sentence increased although he has accepted the conviction
and sentence by choosing not to appeal.110
phase. To pretend otherwise as a reason for holding 18 U.S.C. § 3576 valid
is to ignore reality." Id.
Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the majority's analogy to the revoca-
tion of parole or probation as support for the Court's decision. Id. at 443
( Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's position, see note
85 supra. The dissent noted that in the parole situation there is no increase
in an existing sentence, merely the reinstatement of the original term. 101
S. Ct. at 443 (Brennan, j., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Brennan observed
that a revocation of parole or probation occurs only where there has been a
change in circumstances subsequent to the grant of parole or probation, while
an appeal of a sentence does not involve changed circumstances. Id.
105. 101 S. Ct. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
majority's expectation of finality analysis, see notes 83-85 & 89 and accompany-
ing text supra. justice Brennan argued that it was unreasonable to conclude
that the double jeopardy protection against government oppression following
acquittal is not present in government appeals of sentences. 101 S. Ct. at 444
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, emphasizing the defendant's ex-
pectation, stated that it is a "circular notion" that "the very statute which
increases and prolongs the defendant's anxiety alleviates it by conditioning
his expectations." Id.
106. 101 S. Ct. at 445 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that "[m]erely because § 3576 provides
the Government with appellate rights does not convert the judge's imposition
of sentence into a mere recommendation." Id.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Court in DiFrancesco,
as well as the majority in Pearce, did not adequately respond to Justice Harlan's
dissent in Pearce which had emphasized that the Pearce Court's rejection of an
"'implied acquittal" failed to recognize that the practical effect of an increased
sentence is the same as an increase in the degree of offense. Id. at 445-46
,(Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
109. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). For a discussion
of Pearce, see notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
110. For a discussion of this distinguishing aspect of Pearce, see notes
121-23 and accompanying text infra.
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Although the DiFrancesco opinion is limited to cases arising under
the special offender statute,11 the Supreme Court expressly stated that,
its decision that an increase in sentence under the Act is not multiple!
punishment rested primarily on the fact that, when Congress chooses.
to make a sentence determination subject to appeal by the government,
no double jeopardy interest is violated. 112 Thus, it is suggested that.
the extension of this reasoning would allow Congress to eliminate all
double jeopardy protection for sentence appeals in all criminal cases. 113
It is submitted that the DiFrancesco decision marks a radical de-
parture from previous case law regarding the scope of double jeopardy
protection.1 4 The Benz decision, where the Court, in dicta, stated
that to increase a sentence after the defendant has begun to serve his
term is to subject him to multiple punishment,"35 is but an example
of what was once thought to be the clear mandate of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause." 0a It is submitted that DiFrancesco does not present per.
suasive justification for departing from that traditional analysis.117
At the outset, it is suggested that the DiFrancesco majority's find--
ing that a sentence is not entitled to the degree of finality accorded
to acquittals 118 is unsupported by the Court's prior decisions."19 In
addition it is submitted that the DiFrancesco Court's reliance on
Pearce, Swisher, and Bozza, to support its finding that sentences have
111. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. Presumably, the
special offender statute's counterpart the "dangerous special drug offender"
statute, is also constitutional. See note 11 supra.
112. See notes 84-89 and accompanying text supra. The DiFrancesco Court
reasoned that the expectation of finality in a sentence is crucial to the deter-
mination of double jeopardy protections, and no such expectation exists where
Congress has legislated to the contrary. 101 S. Ct. at 437-38. For a discussion
of this principle, see notes 131-36 and accompanying text infra.
113. Congress has attempted to give the government authority to appeal
sentences in all cases. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3725(b), 124 CONG.
RECORD 5860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978). During the 95th Congress, the Senate
passed a criminal reform bill which made all criminal sentences subject to
appeal. See id. During the 96th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee
passed a government appeal provision. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
3725(b) (1979). However, the House Judiciary Committee voted not to in-
lude a similar provision in its criminal reform legislation. See H.R. 6915,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4101 (1980).
114. See notes 115-30 and accompanying text infra.
115. See notes 50-53 & 86-88 and accompanying text supra. Although the
DiFrancesco Court pointed out that the Benz dicta is not binding, it is sub-
mitted that the principle that to increase a valid final sentence violates theprotection against double jeopardy is more consistent with previous double
jeopardy analysis. For a discussion of multiple punishment, see notes 50-55
and accompanying text supra. See also notes 131-38 and accompanying text
infra.
116. For a list of appellate court decisions holding that increasing a valid
sentence after it has been imposed is unconstitutional, see note 62 supra.
117. See notes 118-38 and accompanying text infra.
118. See notes 72-85 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 121-30 and accompanying text infra.
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not been given the degree of finality accorded acquittals, is misplaced. 120
In Pearce, where the Court allowed an increased sentence after retrial,
the Court expressly based its decision on the principle that double jeop-
ardy protection does not apply where the defendant has sought and
succeeded in having his first conviction overturned. 121  Furthermore,
the Pearce Court emphasized that sentencing is an integral part of the
trial process requiring discretionary power in the trial court to fashion
an appropriate sentence. 22 Thus, it is submitted that the decision and
rationale in Pearce is not apposite to the finality of the sentence when
the original conviction is not appealed by the defendant. 123
Similarly, the Swisher and Bozza decisions involve situations wholly
unlike that in DiFrancesco.24 In Swisher, the Maryland procedure
upheld as constitutional involved juveniles - an area traditionally re-
quiring fewer constitutional safeguards than in the normal criminal
-context.125 Moreover, it is submitted that Justice Brennan's dissent
in DiFrancesco properly pointed out that the procedure in Swisher is
-distinguishable from the special offender statute in that in Swisher,
the master lacked the authority to make determinations of law or fact,
while the district court has such power. 25 Likewise, it is suggested
that the Bozza decision is not precedent for the DiFrancesco decision. 27
The Court in Bozza allowed an increase in an existing sentence al-
though the defendant had begun to serve his prison term since the
-original sentence did not comply with the statutory minimum and
120. For a discussion of the majority's reliance on Pearce, Swisher and
Bozza, see notes 76-81 & 90-93 and accompanying text supra.
121. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 48 supra.
123. It is submitted that the Pearce decision implicitly reaffirmed the
waiver theory which was rejected in Green. For a discussion of the waiver
theory, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has
suggested that Green has, through subsequent Court decisions, been limited to
its particular facts and that the waiver theory is still applicable except with
respect to charges not convicted on at the first trial. See Freeman & Earley,
supra note 43, at 108. It is submitted that, whether Pearce is viewed as
premised on a waiver theory or otherwise, the principle that a defendant may
have his sentence increased upon retrial has no relevance where the government
on its own initiative seeks an increase in a defendant's sentence on appeal.
Moreover, if one looks to the competing interests as set forth in Tateo, society
has been given its opportunity to punish the accused, albeit not as severely as
some would desire. For a discussion of Tateo, see note 40 supra.
124. For a discussion of the DiFrancesco Court's reliance on Swisher and
Bozza, see notes 79 & 90-93 and accompanying text supra.
125. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (states free to
decide if jury trial is desirable in juvenile cases); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-24
(1967) (requiring some due process rights normally given adults be accorded
juveniles but allowing other "unique" juvenile court procedures). Accord,
Freeman & Earley, supra note 43, at 102.
126. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
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was consequently invalid.128 Although under the special offender
statute a court of appeals may increase a sentence only after finding that
the trial court abused its discretion, 129 there is no suggestion in Di-
Francesco that such a sentence is void.180
It is further suggested that in view of the competing interests in--
volved with government appeals of sentences, a defendant's interest in
the finality of his original sentence outweighs the interest of the gov-
ernment in seeking increases in what it views as lenient sentences.131
The DiFrancesco majority found that a defendant has no expectation
of finality in his sentence when sentenced under a statute authorizing a
government appeal therefrom.1 2 However, the interest protected by
the Double Jeopardy Clause, as articulated in Green v. United States, 33
is the prevention of repeated state attempts to punish an individual,
thus causing him repeated expense, embarrassment and anxiety, and a
recognition that the state, with its superior resources, could easily wear
down a defendant with several reprosecutions.1 84 It is submitted that
conditioning the scope of double jeopardy protection on legitimate ex-
128. Id.
129. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3576, see note I1 supra.
130. The DiFrancesco Court, however, stated that under the special offender
statute the court of appeals is empowered to correct legal error in a sentence.
101 S. Ct. at 439. The Court recited the special offender statute s appeal pro-
vision, which allows a court of appeals to increase a sentence if it finds that the
district court "abused its discretion or employed unlawful procedures, or made
clearly erroneous findings." Id., citing 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). For the text
of section 3576, see note 11 supra.
It is submitted that a sentence which is found to meet the special offender
act's standard of invalidity is wholly different from the void sentence in Bozza.
For a discussion of Bozza, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
Whereas the trial court in Bozza had no authority to impose a sentence below
the statutory minimum, in DiFrancesco the district court had the authority to
impose the defendant's sentence. See 101 S. Ct. at 439. While a Bozza-type
sentence is invalid on its face, a sentence will be held invalid on appeal in a
special offender case only after a court of appeals reviews the district court's
trial and sentencing hearing record and makes a subjective redetermination of
the type of punishment the convicted defendant deserves. For the text of the
appeals provision of the special offender Act, see note 11 supra.
131. For a review of the DiFrancesco Court's treatment of these competing
interests, see notes 82-85, 89 & 94-96 and accompanying text supra. For a dis-
cussion of the Court's analysis of these competing interests in United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), see note 40 supra.
132. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
133. For a discussion of Green, see notes 28-29 & 41-43 and accompanying
text supra.
134. This policy objective of the Double Jeopardy Clause has also been
stated as encompassing "the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to
subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm Government
with a potent instrument of oppression." United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). The underlying idea is that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is designed to "limit the exercise of federal governmental power, not to
afford the federal government reciprocal 'rights' against the citizens." Freeman
&- Earley, supra note 43, at 110 n.146.
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pectations circumvents the principles articulated in Green,18 5 as there
could be an expectation of governmental oppression with congressional
changes in our federal criminal law. Moreover, if the scope of con-
stitutional double jeopardy protection is to be determined by expecta-
tion, which may be limited by Congress, then Congress could conceivably
legislate away all double jeopardy protection in criminal sentences.1S6
Finally, it is submitted that the dissent in DiFrancesco properly
perceives that a defendant has as great an interest, if not more, in his
final sentence, than in whether he is initially found guilty or innocent. 1 7
It is suggested that for the defendant who, upon receiving his sentence,
resigns himself to incarceration for that term, an increase in that sen-
tence is multiple punishment.138
The practical effect of the DiFrancesco decision may be to cause
trial courts to mete out harsher sentences on the average even though
not warranted in particular cases.139 It has been suggested by one
commentator that trial judges, sensitive to being overturned on appeal,
will be more prone to imposing sentences closer to the maximum al-
lowed when that sentence is subject to appellate scrutiny. 40 When
the goal of the criminal justice system is to provide for individualized
sentencing,14 1 it is submitted that this effect warrants considerable
attention by Congress should it consider expanding the government's
ability to appeal sentences.1 42
135. For a discussion of Green, see notes 28-29 & 41-43 and accompanying
text supra.
136. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that
Justice Brennan, in his DiFrancesco dissent, properly labels the majority's ex-
pectation analysis as "circular," for if the argument is valid, Congress could
constitutionally authorize government appeals of acquittals. See 101 S. Ct. at
444 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See 101 S. Ct. at 444 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is submtited that a
defendant, knowing of his own puilt, has a great interest in the amount of time
he must serve to pay for his crime. As Justice Brennan pointed out, if a de-
fendant's interest were otherwise, the incidence of plea bargaining would be
much less frequent. Id.
138. The protection against multiple punishment contemplates a bar
against government attempts to .punish the defendant twice for the same offense.
See notes 50-57 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the govern-
ment appeal of sentences allows the prosecution to attempt to convince different
judges of the appro riateness of its desired sentence, thus, giving the prosecution
its "second shot" aNter failing in the opportunity to persuade the trial court.
See Freeman & Earley, supra note 43, at 113.
139. See Freeman & Earley, supra note 43, at 99. "Basic facts of human
nature are that . . . judges usually do not like to be reversed. Thus, pro-
viding the government a right to appeal sentences [below the desired minimum]
would place a form of subtle pressure on the sentencing judge." Id. See also
ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Criminal Code, Report on Government
Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. LAW. 617, 635-36 (1980).
140. See Freeman & Earley, supra note 43, at 99. See also Walsh v. Picard,
446 F.2d 1209, 1212 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
141. See, e.g., P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARDS A JUST
AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 33-35 (1977).
142. See note 113 supra.
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In conclusion, the DiFrancesco court, by allowing government ap-
peals of sentences which are final and within the statutory prescription,
appears to have departed from traditional double jeopardy analysis, as
articulated in prior Court decisions, 148 and to have mistaken the sig-
nificance of interests impinged upon by government appeals of sen-
tences.1 44 It is hoped that the courts of appeals will increase sentences
,only in the most extreme cases, and defer to the necessary discretion of
trial courts in fashioning appropriate sentences.
1 45
Brian L. Lincicome
143. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 131-38 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 48 & 122 and accompanying text supra.
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